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Abstract 
 
This paper extends Sentana and Wadhwani (SW 1992) model to study the presence of 
feedback trading in emissions and energy markets and the extent to which such behaviour is 
linked to the level of arbitrage opportunities. Applying our augmented models to the carbon 
emission and major energy markets in Europe, we find evidence of feedback trading in coal 
and electricity markets, but not in carbon market where the institutional investors dominate. 
This finding is consistent with the notion that institutional investors are less susceptible to 
pursuing feedback-style investment strategies. In further analysis, our results show that the 
intensity of feedback trading is significantly related to the level of arbitrage opportunities, 
and that the significance of such relationship depends on the market regimes.  
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1. Introduction 
Economists have long debated the impact of feedback traders on equilibrium market prices, 
especially after the dramatic rises and falls of stock markets in recent years.1 Some argue that 
their existence is destabilising, causing inefficiency and instability in asset prices (Black, 
1986).2 However, it has also been recognised that the presence of trend-following investors 
can be beneficial as they provide market participants with liquidity (De Long et al. 1990). 
Numerous papers have been devoted to the study of feedback trading activities in global 
markets. The literature has focused primarily on positive feedback strategy whereby investors 
buy (sell) when prices rise (fall) i.e., chasing the trend. Evidence of this type of behaviour is 
found in both individual and institutional investors (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999) and also in a 
wide variety of markets; see, for example, Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) for evidence of 
feedback trading in the U.S. stock market, Antoniou et al. (2005) for the G-7 stock markets, 
Laopodis (2005) for foreign exchange markets, Salm and Schuppli (2010) for index futures 
markets, and Chau et al. (2011) for exchange-traded fund (ETF) markets. When it comes to 
commodity markets, however, there is no clearly identified evidence of the feedback trading, 
despite the increasing use of commodities as an investment tool by the fund industry.3 
In recent years, with the historically low interest rates and meltdowns of financial markets, 
many institutional investors and portfolio managers have turned to commodity markets as a 
way of meeting their investment objectives and, to a lesser extent, as a means of controlling 
                                                          
1 A positive (negative) feedback strategy is a simple trading rule whereby investors buy (sell) after a price rise 
and sell (buy) after a price fall, i.e., trend-following strategies. 
2 It should be noted that feedback trading need not be irrational or noise trading in the sense of Black (1986). It 
is consistent with, for example, portfolio insurance strategies and stop-loss orders. Nonetheless, as Shleifer 
(2000) points out, the interaction of feedback traders and rational investors could lead to price movements that 
are not warranted by their fundamental values.     
3 A notable exception is the recent work of Cifarelli and Paladino (2010) who finds evidence of feedback trading 
in the crude oil market. However, as Koutmos (2012) argues, the use of low frequency data such as the weekly 
data employed by Cifarelli and Paladino (2010) is inadequate to study the short-run feedback trading activity.         
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risk.4 The World Bank (2012, p.70) estimates that “Investment fund activity in commodities is 
currently at 330 US$ billion (as of 2012:Q1)…9 times higher than a decade ago, when this 
activity started becoming a popular investment vehicle within the financial community.” 
Despite the growing popularity of commodity markets in strategic asset allocation, scarce 
evidence exists in the extant literature on the trading behaviour of commodity investors, and 
in particular we can identify a little research examining the presence of feedback (trend-
following) behaviour in these important markets. 5 This is somewhat surprising given the 
nature and design of commodity futures markets (i.e., the low cost of trading, absence of 
short-sales constraints, and high leverage opportunity) can appeal to several feedback-style 
investment strategies such as portfolio insurance, short selling, and margin trading.6 
Previous empirical investigations have generally assumed the behaviour of feedback 
traders is, ceteris paribus, invariant to the level of arbitrage opportunities in financial markets. 
However, it is widely recognised that arbitrage activities and rational speculation are among 
the most significant factors contributing to feedback trading (Cutler et al. 1990; De Long et al. 
1990) and there is growing evidence that the arbitrage opportunities - as measured by the 
spot-futures basis or convenience yield - have a predictive value in future price variations 
(Khoury and Yourougou, 1991; Knetsch, 2007; Gorton et al. 2013), it seems overly 
restrictive to assume that the behaviour of feedback traders is unaffected by the level of 
arbitrage opportunities.  
                                                          
4 Indeed, the potential risk-diversification benefits of investing in commodity markets should offer broad appeal 
across investor types, see Bodie and Rosansky (1980) and Baker and Filbeck (2013).    
5 The majority of previous studies investigate the benefits of including commodities as a separate asset class 
(Campbell et al. 2003), the trends in commodity price forecasting (Gerlow et al. 1993), and the profitability of 
technical trading rules such as momentum and contrarian strategies (Wang and Yu, 2004; Miffre and Rallis, 
2007; Marshall et al. 2008). In contrast, empirical evidence concerning the presence of feedback trading in 
commodity markets is limited. 
6 For instance, Cutler et al. (1990) argues that margin call-induced selling after a series of negative returns is one 
of the main reasons for positive feedback trading. Therefore, it is not uncommon to observe the margin call-
motivated feedback trading activities in commodity futures markets.  
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Against this backdrop, we seek to examine in this paper the presence of feedback trading 
in commodity markets and the extent to which such behaviour is linked to the level of 
arbitrage opportunities using a daily dataset of four major energy markets in Europe (coal, 
electricity, natural gas and crude oil) and the more recently launched carbon emission market. 
The carbon emission market was opened in 2005 to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases. 
The market is built on a “cap-and-trade” system launched by the European Union whereby 
only firms in certain industries can receive free allocation of carbon assets and individuals 
cannot claim carbon assets from emission reduction. As a result, almost all the participants in 
carbon markets are identified as institutional investors. 7  This provides us with a unique 
opportunity of investigating the relation between institutional investors and feedback trading. 
In addition, the carbon market price was generally trending downward with periods of high 
volatility and illiquidity. This allows us to test the hypothesis that feedback traders may be 
responsible, at least in part, for the declining prices. Antoniou et al (2005, p.230) finds that 
“positive feedback trading is more acute at high levels of volatility”, confirming the view that 
feedback traders had a destabilizing influence on market prices. Similar findings are reported 
by Dean and Faff (2008) for the Australian bond and equity markets.8  
More specifically, building on Sentana and Wadhwani (1992, hereafter SW) feedback 
trading model, we aim to address the following questions:  
- Is feedback trading significant in commodity markets? Particularly, whether the investors 
(mostly institutions) in carbon emissions market engage in feedback-style activities?  
- Whether and to what extent arbitrage opportunities affect the intensity of feedback trading? 
                                                          
7 According to the European Union Emission Trading Scheme Transaction Log published in November, 2012, 
less than 6% of total accounts are personal holding accounts (2050 out of a total of 34492 accounts), suggesting 
that the vast majority of participants in the European carbon markets are institutional investors. 
8
 Furthermore, given that it is still a relatively new market (opened in 2005), it is natural to expect that the 
carbon market may attract noise traders in general and positive feedback ‘trend-chasing’ traders in particular. 
Bohl and Siklos (2008, p.1380), for example, finds that “there is evidence of more pronounced positive feedback 
trading strategies in emerging markets relative to mature ones.” 
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- Does the relation between arbitrage opportunities and feedback trading vary across market 
regimes? 
The empirical evidence gathered in this paper has a broad appeal to those who have 
invested (or considering investing) in commodities, and bears practical significance for 
portfolio managers and commodity traders relying on trend-chasing investment strategies. 
Our results are also of direct relevance to regulators and policymakers in formulating 
effective policies to tackle uncertainty caused by speculative trading, especially during the 
turbulent periods. Taken together, our study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. 
First, we complement the recent research of Cifarelli and Paladino (2010) who documents a 
significant feedback trading in crude oil market. However, as Koutmos (2012) suggests, the 
low frequency data such as the weekly data used by Cifarelli and Paladino (2010) is 
insufficient for the study of short-run feedback trading strategies. One of our goals is, 
therefore, to address the inadequacy of using weekly data in analysing feedback trading 
activities and to provide robustness check of the results by Cifarelli and Paladino (2010) with 
a daily dataset. Moreover, we extend their investigation to other energy markets (including 
coal, electricity and natural gas markets) to provide new evidence of feedback trading. 
Second, to the best of our knowledge, this paper also represents the first attempt to study the 
trading behaviour of market participants in the newly opened carbon emission market. As the 
carbon emission markets are quickly developing to an alternative asset class for investors, 
discovering the trading behaviour of investors in these markets has a broad appeal in 
finance.9 Additionally, since the vast majority of investors in carbon market are institutional 
investors, the results obtained could be particularly relevant in providing a deeper 
understanding of institutional investors’ trading philosophy and strategy. 
                                                          
9 The European carbon emission market is worth around $150 billion in 2011, which is 20 times than in 2005. It 
is nowadays a sizable market which attracting increasing amount of investments (Charles, et al. 2011). 
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Third, and more importantly, this paper adds to the growing number of studies in 
examining the influence of arbitrage opportunities on investor trading behaviour. Arbitrage, 
one form of rational speculation, has been seen as a key driver for feedback trading (De Long 
et al., 1990). Arbitrage opportunities may also be considered by traders as a signal to trade. 
This study extends the standard feedback trading model by allowing arbitrage opportunities 
to affect the demand of feedback traders, in both additive and multiplicative ways. The results 
of our analysis are important in understanding the speculative behaviour of commodity 
futures markets investors, where arbitrage and hedging are believed to be the main motives of 
transaction. In addition, we estimate our augmented feedback trading models in different 
market regimes, i.e. bull and bear markets, to examine whether the degree of feedback trading 
and the effect of arbitrage opportunities vary across market conditions. Finally, unlike many 
previous studies which assume a particular conditional variance specification, this paper 
conducts a detailed specification test to identify an appropriate model for each market. 
The main findings of our investigation can be summarised as follows. First, our results 
show that feedback trading is significant in coal and electricity markets, but not in carbon, 
natural gas and crude oil markets. As the vast majority of investors in carbon emissions 
markets are institutions, the results do not support the notion that institutional investors 
contribute to feedback trading, in contrast to the findings of Nofsinger and Sias (1999). 
Moreover, the results of our augmented feedback trading models suggest that arbitrage 
opportunities have a significant influence on feedback traders’ demand in electricity and 
natural gas markets. This finding is consistent with the view that the behaviour of feedback 
traders tend to vary depending on the level of arbitrage opportunities in these markets. 
Additional analysis indicates that the response of feedback trader to past return or arbitrage 
opportunities depends on market regimes. Overall, our results are robust to the alternative 
measures of arbitrage opportunities including spot-futures basis and the convenience yield. 
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related 
literature and outlines alternative feedback trading models used in the ensuing investigation. 
The data and model selection results are provided in Section 3. Section 4 presents and 
analyses the main empirical results, and Section 5 discusses the robustness checks. Section 6 
concludes the paper.  
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2. Research background 
2.1 Related literature 
Whether noise trader in general and feedback trader in particular affects stock prices is a 
question of long-standing interest to economists. Shiller (1984), for instance, argues that 
social norms or fashions can influence asset price movements. Black (1986) introduces the 
concept of noise traders and offers a formal definition of ‘noise trading’ as trading on noise 
(or non-information) as if it were information. SW develops a heterogeneous trader model to 
demonstrate that trading between rational arbitrageurs and feedback traders gives bubble-like 
patterns. Positive feedback traders reinforced by arbitrageurs’ jumping on the bandwagon 
leads to positive autocorrelation of returns at short horizons. Eventual return of prices to 
fundamentals, accelerated by arbitrage, entails a negative autocorrelation of returns at long 
horizons. Since news result in price changes that are reinforced by positive feedback traders, 
stock prices overreact to news and exhibit excessive volatility of a destabilising fashion. 
Moreover, SW finds the interesting result that returns switch from being positively 
autocorrelated to negatively autocorrelated as volatility increases, predicting a negative 
relationship between volatility and autocorrelation.  
In subsequent investigations, and consistent with the existence of positive feedback traders, 
a negative relationship between autocorrelation and volatility has also been found to be the 
feature of returns in both mature and emerging stock markets (Bohl and Siklos, 2008), 
foreign exchange markets (Laopodis, 2005), index futures markets (Salm and Schuppli, 2010), 
ETF markets (Chau et al., 2011), and crude oil market (Cifarelli and Paladino, 2010). In 
addition, a growing number of studies have attempted to extend the feedback trading model. 
For instance, Faff et al. (2005) modifies the standard feedback trading model by introducing a 
cross-market feedback trader, whose demand function is also sensitive to the price movement 
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in the foreign markets. Chau et al. (2011) considers the effect of investor sentiment on the 
feedback traders’ demand function and develops an augmented model with sentiment. 
Koutmos (2012) incorporates the role of an additional group of investors i.e., the fundamental 
traders, in the determination of stock return dynamics. More recently, Chau and Deesomsak 
(2014) finds a significant feedback trading in the major stock exchanges of G-7 countries and 
the intensity of feedback trading is linked to the overall macroeconomic conditions. 
Nonetheless, the aforementioned literature does not take into consideration the potential 
impact of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading behaviour. Feedback trading can be the 
result of various motivations. De Long et al. (1990) argues that rational speculation and 
arbitrage are among the most important factors contributing to feedback trading. Interpreted 
within the context of futures markets, spot-futures arbitrage is a trading strategy that rational 
investors pursue to profit from the deviation of futures price from its underlying spot price 
(Chung, 1991). This is also the central mechanism in maintaining the linkage between two 
markets (MacKinlay and Ramaswamy, 1988) and to contribute to price discovery (Garbade 
and Silber, 1983). When spot-futures basis (a widely used signal for arbitrage opportunity) 
increases beyond a threshold level, arbitragers can simultaneously buy futures and sell the 
underlying asset to benefit from these price deviations (Kumar and Seppi, 1994). Intuitively, 
to the extent that the presence of arbitrage opportunities motivates more investors to trade, 
the level of feedback trading is also expected to increase as a result of enhanced rational 
speculation and arbitrage activities. While the profitability of arbitrage (Chung, 1991) and 
spot-futures mispricing (McMillian and Philip, 2012) have been extensively studied, the issue 
of whether arbitrage opportunities affect feedback trading activities is yet to be explored. 
Furthermore, in recent years the commodity markets have become increasingly important 
in tactical asset allocation. The trading strategies of commodity investors attract considerable 
attention in academic research. Miffre and Rallis (2007) shows that both momentum and 
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contrarian strategies are profitable in commodity markets. Marshall et al. (2008) suggests that 
certain technical trading rules can generate abnormal returns in commodity markets. However, 
to date, there exists a limited research on feedback trading strategy in commodities. Cifarelli 
and Paladino (2010) examines feedback trading in the U.S. crude oil markets using weekly 
data, but the vast of majority existing research utilises either daily or intraday prices. There is 
a benefit of using a high frequency dataset because feedback traders usually adopt short-run 
computerised strategies to capture the observed trends which tend to vanish quickly 
(Koutmos, 2012). The use of weekly data may fail to detect these feedback trading activities.  
Motivated by the forgoing discussion, we seek to examine in this paper the existence of 
feedback trading in commodity futures markets and the extent to which such behaviour is 
linked to the level of arbitrage opportunities. Numerous studies have investigated the links 
between arbitrage opportunities (as measured by spot-futures basis and/or convenience yield) 
and hedging (Lien and Yang, 2008; Millios and Six, 2011), and there have been a number of 
empirical investigations concerned with the predicative power of basis for futures returns, 
both theoretically (Khoury and Martel, 1989) and empirically (Khoury and Yourougou, 1991). 
However, to our knowledge, there has been no empirical investigation on the question of 
whether (and how) arbitrage opportunities influence feedback traders’ investment decisions. 
In this paper we make several extensions to SW’s model to allow the behaviour of feedback 
trader to vary depending on the level of arbitrage opportunities. We investigate the statistical 
support for our new feedback models using a daily dataset on emission and energy markets. 
To establish the background for the ensuing analysis, we briefly discuss in the next section 
the SW model of feedback trading and introduce our extended versions of this model. 
 
2.2 Feedback trading models 
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2.2.1 SW’s feedback trading model   
Several feedback trading models have been proposed in the literature carrying different 
implications for the autocorrelation pattern of returns. For example, the feedback models 
developed by Shiller (1984) and Cutler et al. (1990) imply positive autocorrelation of returns. 
However, as Shiller (1989) points out, the interaction of rational investors and feedback 
traders can give rise to negligible, even negative autocorrelation. Recent research suggests 
that the autocorrelation pattern of stock returns is more complex than commonly believed and, 
consistent with the existence of positive feedback traders, autocorrelation and volatility are 
also found to be inversely related (Antoniou et al. 2005).  
The approach adopted by Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) is based on the assumption that 
investors are heterogeneous in the sense that some investors (‘smart-money’) follow expected 
utility maximising behaviour, whereas others follow feedback trading (trend-following) 
strategies. Specifically, the demand for shares by the first group (rational expected utility 
maximisers) is given by:  
1( )t t
t
t
E RS α
µ
− −=             (1) 
where tS  is the fraction of shares that ‘smart money’ investors hold, 1( )t tE R− is the expected 
return at time t based on the information available at time t-1, α is the rate of return on a risk-
free asset, and μt is the risk premium when all the shares are held by this group of investors. 
Assuming a positive risk aversion for rational investors, the risk premium can be modelled as: 
2( )t tµ µ σ=              (2) 
where 2tσ is the conditional variance of returns at time t and μ(.) is an increasing function. As 
the risk associated with returns increases, investors require a higher risk premium. It follows 
12 
 
that, when all the shares are held by ‘smart money’ and the market is in equilibrium (i.e.,
1tS = ), Equation (1) is equivalent to the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM): 
2
1( ) ( )t t tE R α µ σ− − =             (3) 
The other group of investors (feedback traders) do not base their investment decisions on 
fundamentals but rather react to previous price changes. Their demand function is given as: 
1t tF Rγ −=               (4) 
where Rt-1 is the ex-post stock return at time t-1 and γ is the marginal response of feedback 
traders to previous returns. Positive feedback trading strategy is a bet that past performance 
will continue into the future and thus buy after a price rise and sell after a price fall (γ > 0). 
On the contrary, negative feedback traders buy (sell) when price is falling (increasing) to 
reflect their belief that trends will soon reverse (γ < 0). In equilibrium all shares must be held: 
1t tS F+ =               (5) 
Substituting (1), (2) & (4) into (5) and rearranging gives: 
2 2
1 1( ) ( ) ( )t t t t tE R Rα µ σ γµ σ− −− = −           (6) 
Assuming that the ‘smart-money’ investors have rational expectation, i.e.,  
1( )t t t tR E R ε−= +              (7) 
where εt is an independently and identically distributed error term. Equation (6) can then be 
reformulated as:  
2 2
1( ) ( )t t t t tR Rα µ σ γµ σ ε+−= + −            (8) 
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The term -γμ(σt2)Rt-1 in Equation (8) implies that the presence of positive (negative) feedback 
trading will induce negative (positive) autocorrelation in returns, and the higher the volatility 
the more negative the autocorrelation. However, Equation (8) does not consider the return 
autocorrelation caused by non-synchronous trading and other market imperfections. Allowing 
for these possibilities and taking a linear form of risk premium, SW assumes the following 
empirical version of feedback trading model: 
2 2
0 1 1( )t t t t tR Rα ρσ γ γ σ ε−= + + + +          (9) 
where γ0 is the coefficient of first order autocorrelation induced by market imperfections and 
γ1=-γμ. Thus, the presence of positive (negative) feedback trading implies that γ1 is negative 
(positive) and statistically significant. Hereafter this model is referred to as baseline Model I. 
 
2.2.2 Feedback trading with arbitrage opportunities 
It is clear from Equation (4) and the baseline Model I that, the demand of feedback traders 
depends solely on previous price changes. Yet, an increasing number of studies show a strong 
linkage between the level of arbitrage opportunities and the trading behaviour of investors. 
Kumar and Seppi (1994) and Miller et al. (1994) indicate that the dynamics of basis or 
convenience yield can provide a useful signal for the existence of arbitrage opportunities. 
When the basis increases beyond a threshold level, rational speculators (or feedback traders) 
can exploit these opportunities by simultaneously trading in the spot and futures markets. 
Lien and Yang (2008) also demonstrates the importance of incorporating the changes of basis 
into hedging decision. They show that the spot-futures basis significantly affects the optimal 
hedge ratio estimation and hedging performance. A more recent study by Mellios and Six 
(2011) finds that the demand for hedging is highly associated with convenience yield.  
14 
 
Motivated by the above literature, in this paper we extend the model proposed by SW in 
order to examine whether arbitrage opportunities affect the intensity of feedback trading. For 
simplicity, as in SW, we assume there are two distinct groups of investors: ‘smart money’ 
investors and feedback traders, and let the demand for shares by smart money investors be 
given by Equation (1). However, we allow the demand for shares by feedback traders 
depends not only on the past returns but also on the observed level of arbitrage opportunities 
in the markets (as proxied by the lagged basis). Consider first extending the baseline Model I 
so that the demand by feedback traders depends in an additive way on the level of arbitrage 
opportunities:  
1 1+t t tF R Bγ δ− −=            (10) 
where Bt-1 is the lagged basis, given ,= ln ( / )t t t TB S F and δ is a coefficient measuring the 
sensitivity of feedback traders to arbitrage opportunities (as captured by the lagged basis). 
Substituting (1), (2) & (10) into (5) and rearranging gives:  
2 2 2
1 1 -1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t tE R R Bα µ σ γµ σ δµ σ− −− = − −        (11) 
Assuming the rational expectation and taking γ2=-δμ produces the empirical version of our 
augmented feedback trading model (Model II): 
2 2 2
0 1 1 2 1( )t t t t t t tR R Bα ρσ γ γ σ γ σ ε− −= + + + + +        (12) 
It is interesting to note that return in period t depends additively on the measure of arbitrage 
opportunities Bt-1 and the extent of this dependence varies with conditional volatility 2tσ .  
In Model II, the reaction of feedback traders to price changes is not in itself dependent on 
the level of arbitrage opportunities, although their overall demand is. As an alternative we 
also consider a demand function that is affected by arbitrage proxies in a multiplicative way: 
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1 -1( )t t tF B Rγ δ −= +           (13)  
where Bt-1 is defined as before. Substituting (1), (2) & (13) into (5) and rearranging gives:  
2 2
1 -1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t tE R B Rα µ σ γ δ µ σ− −− = − +        (14) 
Following the empirical approximation of SW and taking γ2=-δμ again produces the 
empirical version of our second augmented model (Model III): 
2 2 2
0 1 2 1 1( )t t t t t t tR B Rα ρσ γ γ σ γ σ ε− −= + + + + +       (15) 
 
2.2.3 Conditional volatility specifications 
Completion of the feedback trading Models (I)-(III) requires the conditional variance of 
returns 2tσ to
 be well-specified. Since it is well established that stock returns are conditionally 
heteroscedastic, many studies approximate the conditional volatility with a generalised 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (GARCH)-type specification. SW assumes the 
exponential GARCH (EGARCH) in their study, but increasing number of researchers 
(Antoniou et al., 2005; Chau et al., 2011) are adopting an alternative asymmetric GARCH 
model proposed by Glosten et al. (1993) to capture the asymmetric effect in the conditional 
variance process. Cappiello et al. (2006) warns that if the GARCH model is not well-
specified, the estimation results would no longer be consistent.10 Therefore, in order to select 
the most appropriate model for the ensuing analysis, we conduct extensive tests to see which 
conditional volatility equation seems to fit our data the best. We compare three most popular 
volatility models in our specification tests:  
                                                          
10  The search and application of an appropriate GARCH model is also important to ensure that ‘non-
convergence’ problem is reduced to minimal. Most univariate GARCH models should encounter few 
convergence problems if the model is correctly specified and fits data reasonably well (Alexander, 2001). 
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2 2 2
0 1 1 1t t tσ α α ε βσ− −= + +       [GARCH]   (16) 
0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tGσ α α βσ− −= + + ;    1 11
1 1
2| |t tt
t t
G ε εδ
σ π σ
− −
−
− −
= − +     [EGARCH]   (17) 
2 2 2 2
0 1 1 1 1 1t t t t tIσ α α ε βσ δ ε− − − −= + + +     [GJR-GARCH]  (18) 
where 2tσ is the conditional variance at time t, εt-1 is the innovation at time t-1 and It-1 is a 
dummy variable which takes a value of one in response to bad news (εt-1<0) and zero 
otherwise. The ‘best-performing’ model is selected for each series using several criteria, 
including the log-likelihood function (Log L), heteroscedasticity-adjusted mean squared error 
(HMSE) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
Most studies dealing with stock returns use the normal density function. However, the 
standardised residuals obtained from GARCH models that assume normality appear to be 
leptokurtic, rendering standard t-tests unreliable. Following Antoniou et al. (2005), this paper 
employs a more general density function i.e., the Generalised Error Distribution (GED) to 
allow for fat tails. Its density function is given by: 
1/2 3/2 /2( , , ) [ (3 / )] [ (1/ )] (1/ ) exp( [ (3 / ) / (1/ )] | | )
2t t t t t
f ννµ σ ν ν ν σ ν ν ε σ−= Γ Γ − Γ Γ   (19) 
where Γ(.) is the gamma function and ν is a scale parameter (or the degree of freedom) to be 
estimated endogenously. When ν=2, GED yields normal distribution and for ν=1 it yields the 
Laplace distribution.11 
 
                                                          
11 For robustness, we also estimated our empirical models using the normal density function. The results are 
essentially the same as those presented in Section 4. In the interest of brevity, results of this robustness check are 
not reported but available from the authors on request.  
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3. Data and methodology 
Our sample includes the daily spot and futures prices of carbon emission allowances and 
four major energy markets within the European Union, namely coal, electricity, natural gas 
and crude oil. In particular, the following futures contracts listed in the Intercontinental 
Exchange (ICE) and their reference spot prices are collected and analysed: EU Emission 
Allowance (EUA) futures (carbon emission); Rotterdam coal futures (coal); UK electricity 
futures (electricity); UK natural gas futures (natural gas); Brent crude oil futures (crude oil).12 
The starting date for each commodity varies due to the data availability: 03/03/2008 (carbon), 
17/07/2006 (coal), 27/12/2006 (electricity), 06/02//2003 (natural gas), 08/09/2003 (crude oil). 
The end date is 30/09/2012 for all commodities. All data were obtained from DataStream and 
are expressed in the currency of each market’s home country. To construct a continuous 
series of futures prices, we rollover the futures contracts on the first day of new trading 
month, for all available traded months. For the estimation of implied convenience yields, we 
follow Heaney (2002)’s approach and use the 3-month mid-rate of Euro-currency (London) 
USD, Euro and GBP as estimates of the risk-free rate. 
 [TABLE 1 about here]  
The summary statistics of daily futures returns ( 1ln(P / P ) 100%t t tR −= � ) are presented in 
Panel A of Table 1. It is evident that coal and crude oil returns are negatively skewed while 
carbon, electricity and natural gas returns are positively skewed. All five series are highly 
leptokurtic and exhibit departures from normality (as implied by Jarque-Bera test statistics). 
Ljung-Box statistics show a clear evidence of serial correlation in all returns except carbon, 
                                                          
12 These futures contracts have been widely used in the literature as proxies for each relevant commodity market. 
See, for example, Daskalakis et al. (2009) for carbon emission market, Borger et al.(2009) for coal market, Bunn 
and Gianfreda (2010) for electricity market, Hochradl and Rammerstorfer (2012) for natural gas market, and 
Ellen and Zwinkels (2010) for crude oil market. 
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and in all squared returns apart from natural gas. Significant ARCH effect is also found in 
carbon, coal, electricity and crude oil return series. The JOINT test of Engle and Ng (1993) 
for testing asymmetries in conditional volatility indicates significant asymmetries in all cases. 
Overall, the statistical nature of return distribution supports the use of a generalised 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH)-type model for the variance process. 
All five commodity markets are positively correlated, particularly between electricity and 
natural gas (Panel B of Table 1).  
To gauge an initial idea on the degree of feedback trading in commodity markets, we 
estimate a simple autoregressive model of order five, AR(5). The results reported in Panel C 
of Table 1 show that there are significant autocorrelations and the coefficients are mostly 
negative. The interaction between feedback traders and rational investors can however give 
rise to return patterns that are more complex than a simple autoregressive model can capture 
(Chau et al. 2011). It is therefore imperative and informative to investigate the significance of 
feedback trading in these markets and whether the intensity of such trading behaviour varies 
depending on the level of arbitrage opportunities.  
[TABLE 2 about here]  
Summary statistics of the spot-futures basis and convenience yield are given in Table 2. 
The mean of all spot-futures bases are reasonably close to zero; however their absolute values 
are generally smaller than that of convenience yield. It is evident that convenience yields of 
these commodities are generally more volatile than their basis. There is also some evidence 
of skewness and excess kurtosis, contributing to the clear departures from normality. 
[TABLE 3 about here]  
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Table 3 reports the specification test results for GARCH volatility models. The search and 
application of an appropriate GARCH model specification is important to ensure that non-
convergence problem is reduced to minimal (Alexander, 2001). We therefore compare three 
popular volatility models and select the most appropriate specification on the basis of log-
likelihood function (Log L), heteroscedasticity-adjusted mean squared error (HMSE) and 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The ‘best-performing’ conditional variance equation for 
each market is presented in the last column; EGARCH for carbon, electricity, and natural gas; 
GJR-GARCH for coal and crude oil. Consistent with the JOINT test results given in Table 1, 
asymmetric models seem to fit our data better than the symmetric model in all cases. This in 
turn implies that the conditional variance is an asymmetric function of past squared residuals, 
i.e., past negative innovations increase volatility more than past positive innovations.13 
  
4. Results and discussion   
4.1 Feedback trading in emissions and energy markets 
In Table 4 we present the estimation results of the original SW model (baseline Model I). 
At first glance we notice that the coefficients describing the conditional variance process, α0, 
α1, and β are all highly significant, indicating that the current volatility is a function of last 
period’s squared innovation and last period’s volatility. This is further confirmed by the 
overwhelmingly significant (at the 5% level) β coefficients, reflecting significant temporal 
dependencies and persistence in the conditional volatility process. Additionally, volatility 
also appears highly asymmetric as illustrated by the significance of δ (with an exception of 
coal market). This is perhaps not surprising given our model selection results reported in 
                                                          
13 Despite the lack of a conclusive theory, most of the studies of financial returns also document the negative 
relationship between return and volatility. Several hypotheses have been proposed in the literature to explain the 
asymmetric volatility phenomenon e.g., the leverage effect and the volatility feedback effect.   
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Table 3 and that the volatility asymmetry phenomenon (i.e., responses to bad news lead to 
greater volatility than do responses to good news) has been widely documented in the 
literature.14 A number of hypotheses have been proposed to explain this phenomenon such as 
the leverage effect and the volatility feedback effect. Interestingly, a study by Antoniou et al. 
(2005) argues that the reaction of positive feedback traders to bad news is usually greater 
than it is to good news, resulting in asymmetric volatility (at least in part). To examine 
whether this is the case, we consider next the estimates of parameters γ0 and γ1 in the 
conditional mean equation to test the presence of feedback trading in our sample markets.   
[TABLE 4 about here]  
As shown in Panel A of Table 4, the constant component of return autocorrelation (γ0) is 
positive and significant for coal and electricity at 5% level, and for natural gas at 10% level, 
showing positive first-order autocorrelation. These are consistent with our autoregressive 
regression results reported in Table 1. Non-synchronous trading and market frictions can 
cause positive autocorrelation in ex-post return, especially in relatively high frequency data. 
The existence of positive (negative) feedback trading, on the other hand, induces negative 
(positive) autocorrelation that increases, in absolute terms, with the level of volatility. In this 
respect it is interesting to see that, with the exception of carbon and natural gas, γ1 is 
significant (at the 10 % level at least) showing evidence of feedback trading and their 
influence tend to be greater in the periods of high volatility. This is not surprising given the 
design and market operation of commodity futures (i.e., the low cost of trading, absence of 
short-sales constraints, and high leverage opportunity) appeal to many trend-following 
strategies such as portfolio insurance, short selling, and margin trading. A large body of 
research documents that feedback-style trading strategies earn significant abnormal returns in 
                                                          
14 The estimated scale parameter ν in the GED function is significant and below 2 in all cases showing that all 
the error terms are not normally distributed and confirms the use of density functions with thicker tails, such as 
GED distribution. For ν=2, the GED reduces to the standard normal distribution. 
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a variety of commodity markets; see, for example, Miffre and Rallis (2007) for evidence 
regarding  momentum strategies, Wang and Yu (2004) for contrarian strategies, and Cifarelli 
and Paladino (2010) for evidence of positive feedback trading in the U.S. crude oil market. 
In contrast, the insignificance of γ1 in the carbon and natural gas markets implies that there 
is no significant feedback trading in these markets and investors do not base their investment 
decisions solely on previous price changes. As the vast majority of investors in carbon market 
are institutions, our results support the notion that institutional investors are less susceptible 
to behaviourally biased trading than retail investors, but are in contrast with the evidence of 
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) who concludes that institutional investors positive-feedback trade 
more than individual investors.15 The insignificant feedback trading parameter found in oil 
and gas markets may be attributable to their unique market design and operation causing 
these markets less susceptible to feedback trading activities.16 Relatively low trading volume 
in coal and electricity markets could also be a contributing factor because there is a greater 
likelihood that disequilibrium price will be persisted in an illiquid market attracting feedback 
traders to profit from the price deviation. Nonetheless, the absence of base feedback trading 
does not preclude the possibility of feedback trading conditional on the level of arbitrage 
opportunities. To investigate this possibility, we now turn to the focus of this paper and 
consider the effect of observed arbitrage opportunities over the presence and/or intensity of 
feedback trading.  
 
4.2 The effect of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading 
                                                          
15 It is also worth of noting that an array of diagnostics tests performed on the standardised residuals show no 
serious misspecification of the model (Panel C of Table 4).  
16 For instance, one can argue that electricity is more prone to innovation than other markets and thus attracts 
relatively more significant feedback trading. A further examination of the reasons why feedback trading is found 
in coal and electricity, and not in oil and gas, is worthy of a study but is beyond the scope of the current paper. 
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In this section, we examine the influence of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading. 
To that end, we use spot-futures basis as a proxy for the level of arbitrage opportunities (as in 
Sofianos, 1993; Kumar and Seppi, 1994) and run a set of regressions described in Models II 
and III to investigate whether arbitrage opportunities affect feedback trader’s demand.17  
 [TABLE 5 about here]  
Consider first the estimation results of Model II (Equation 12) where we allow the level of 
arbitrage opportunities (as measured by the lagged basis) to additively affect the demand for 
shares by feedback traders. In this model, a positive γ2 (where γ2=-δμ) suggests that feedback 
traders sell futures when spot price is higher than futures price in the last period while a 
negative γ2 implies that they long futures when the lagged basis is positive. The results given 
in Table 5 show coefficients in the conditional variance equation are in line with the results of 
Model I, implying the presence of highly persistent and asymmetric volatility. This of course 
is an empirical regularity observed in almost all financial volatility series. Likewise, the base 
feedback trading parameter γ1 remains significant for coal and electricity at the 5% level 
confirming that there exists significant feedback trading in these markets. Interestingly, the 
arbitrage-related feedback trading parameter γ2 are also significant (at the 10 % level at least) 
suggesting that some feedback traders condition their trades upon the observed level of 
arbitrage opportunities. This finding is consistent with the view that arbitrage opportunities 
(as measured by the basis) can provide a useful signal for trading. Specifically, when the 
basis increases beyond a threshold level, speculators or feedback traders can exploit the 
opportunities by simultaneously trading in the spot and futures markets. Moreover, in line 
with the results of baseline Model I, it is interesting to note that without accounting for the 
arbitrage opportunities no feedback trading is present in natural gas market. However, the 
                                                          
17 Although we use basis as a proxy for arbitrage opportunities in the main analysis, we have also examined the 
robustness of our results to an alternative proxy using the convenience yield. The results (reported in Section 5) 
confirm that our main conclusions hold irrespective of the proxy used.  
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arbitrage-related feedback trading parameter γ2 is negative and statistically significant (at the 
5% level) indicating that some arbitrageurs (negative feedback traders) buy futures when the 
futures price falls below the underlying spot price in order to profit from price discrepancy. 
Miller et al. (1994), for example, argues that when spot price is too high relative to futures 
price and the basis is wider than its theoretical level, arbitrageurs can simultaneously short-
sell the spot asset and buy futures to exploit the arbitrage opportunities. Our results confirm 
the above argument and also support our conjecture that there exists a significant linkage 
between arbitrage opportunities and feedback trading. 
  [TABLE 6 about here]  
Consider next the results for Model III (Equation 15) given in Table 6. Recall that this 
model allows the reaction of feedback traders to previous price changes to depend on the 
observed level of arbitrage opportunities (the lagged basis enters the model multiplicatively). 
In this model, a positive (negative) γ2 suggests that feedback traders are more likely short 
(long) futures when the past futures return and the lagged basis are both positive (negative). 
Consistent with the results of our previous models, the feedback parameters γ1 and γ2 are both 
insignificant for carbon and crude oil markets, confirming that there is no significant 
feedback trading in these two markets. On the other hand, for the remaining three markets, 
both parameters are significant at the 5% level. In coal market, γ1=-0.0132 and γ2=0.0913. 
The results indicate that there is positive feedback trading and the intensity of such trading is 
conditional on the observed level of basis. When basis is greater than 0.1446, it switches to 
be negative feedback trading. Similarly, γ1=-0.0001 and γ2=0.0005 in natural gas market. 
When the basis is immaterial in natural gas market, feedback investors have more futures 
long position after futures price rises, but the degree of positive feedback trading is 
diminishing and turns to be insignificant when basis approaches 0.2. With regard to the 
electricity market, negative feedback trading is more prevalent when basis is negligible 
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(γ1=0.0009) and the degree of negative feedback trading increases as basis becomes widen 
(γ2=0.0595). However, when basis decreases to -0.0151 (i.e. spot price falls below its futures 
price by 1.52%), it turns to be positive feedback trading. It is also interesting to see that γ2 
parameter for all five markets are positive, albeit some insignificance.  
Overall, the results of the above analysis show that the degree of positive (negative) 
feedback trading decreases (increases) as the lagged basis becomes widen. The lagged spot-
futures basis provides useful indicator for feedback trading, who can use this as a signal of 
‘channel breakouts’ in technical analysis. When the basis is within certain thresholds, 
feedback traders expect that the current trend of futures prices will persist and adopt a trend-
following positive feedback trading strategy. However, if the basis is wide enough, the 
current channel will be broken out by arbitrageurs; as a result, negative feedback trading 
becomes more profitable. This is consistent with the findings of Marshall et al. (2008) who 
concludes that channel breakouts trading rules are consistently profitable in the U.S. 
commodity markets; supporting the argument that many rational arbitrageurs tend to jump on 
the bandwagon themselves before eventually selling out near the top and take their profit. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
5.1 Alternative measure of arbitrage opportunities 
While the difference between spot and futures prices (the basis) has been extensively used 
as a signal and measure of arbitrage opportunities, spot-futures basis is a relatively simple 
proxy and does not take into account the costs of arbitrage such as borrowing costs and 
opportunity costs. Convenience yield, on the other hand, reflects these costs because it is 
estimated from using information on basis, the dynamic risk-free rates, and time-to-maturity. 
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Economically, convenience yield measures the benefit of holding spot inventory rather than 
buying futures contracts. It demonstrates the economic relationship between spot and futures 
prices. Therefore, similar to the basis, convenience yield can also be seen as a useful indicator 
of the futures price movement. Bertus et al. (2009) and Mellios and Six (2011) show that 
convenience yield can affect hedging demand and optimal hedge ratio. In this section, we 
examine the sensitivity of our results to an alternative measure for arbitrage opportunities i.e. 
convenience yield. 
The convenience yield is estimated from the cost-of-carry model. As shown by Brennan 
(1958), the future price is jointly determined by the spot price, risk-free rate, convenience 
yield, and the time to maturity in the following fashion: 
( )( )
,
Rft CYt T t
t T tF S e
− −
=            (20) 
where Rft is the continuously compounded risk-free rate at time t, T is the maturity time of the 
futures contract, St is spot price at time t, Ft,T is the futures price at time t matures at time T, 
and CYt is the convenience yield at time t. Rearranging Equation (20) gives CYt as: 
,1 1ln( )t Tt t t t
t
F
CY Rf Rf Basis
T t S T t
= − = +
− −
      (21) 
It can be seen from Equation (21) that convenience yield moves with basis, risk-free rate, and 
time-to-maturity. This estimation method is widely used in literature, see e.g., Milonas and 
Henker (2001). To check the sensitivity of our earlier results to this alternative measure, we 
replace the basis with convenience yield and then repeat the estimations for models II and III: 
Model II’:  2 2 20 1 1 2 1( )t t t t t t tR R CYα ρσ γ γ σ γ σ ε− −= + + + + +     (22) 
Model III’: 2 2 20 1 2 1 1( )t t t t t t tR CY Rα ρσ γ γ σ γ σ ε− −= + + + + +     (23) 
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 [TABLE 7 about here]  
The estimation results of Model II’ are given in Table 7. To keep the discussion compact, 
we concentrate on the interpretations of the values for feedback parameters γ1 and γ2 which 
indicate the level of feedback trading and the influence of arbitrage opportunities (as proxied 
by convenience yield). With an exception of natural gas, the results of γ1 are largely 
consistent with models using basis. Although the parameters become smaller than those 
reported in Table 5, estimates for the arbitrage-related feedback trading parameter γ2 in 
electricity and natural gas markets remain negative and statistically significant. This confirms 
that feedback traders respond positively to last period’s futures return and convenience yield, 
i.e. they hold long positions in futures when returns and convenience yield are both positive. 
Feedback traders tend to long futures when convenience yield is positive because they expect 
the benefits of holding spot asset will diminish and futures prices will increase accordingly.  
[TABLE 8 about here]  
Table 8 presents the estimation results of Model III’. Consistent with the results in Table 6, 
γ1 and γ2 are both insignificant for carbon and crude oil markets. Again, this implies that there 
is no significant feedback trading in these markets. For the other energy markets, both 
feedback parameters retain their sign and significance. It is also worth noting that parameter 
γ2 for all five markets are still positive (although it is insignificant for carbon and crude oil). 
Taken together, the results presented in this section for Models II’ & III’ support our 
conjecture that the earlier results of Models II & III are not driven by the choice of measure 
for arbitrage opportunities and the empirical findings are consistent. 
 
5.2 The effect of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading across market regimes 
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The results thus far provide a clear evidence of feedback trading in some energy markets, 
and the spot-futures dynamics has significant influence on the intensity of feedback trading. 
These are consistent with the argument that basis and convenience yield are linked to 
arbitrage, hedging and the behaviourally-biased feedback trading activities. However, our 
sample covers the time periods spanning from bull to bear markets in energy markets. 
Therefore, in the vein of Chau et al. (2011), it is interesting and informative to further 
investigate whether the reaction of feedback traders to the observed level of arbitrage 
opportunities (as measured by the lagged basis and CY) depends on the market regimes. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank energy index, energy 
prices reached its historical peak in July 2008 but started to decline subsequently.18 Thus, we 
use this as the cut-off point to identify bull market as the period before July 2008 and bear 
market as the period thereafter. Given the unique design and operation of the European 
Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), we divide the carbon market data into Phase I (06/2005 
- 12/2006) and Phase II (03/2008 - 09/2012) and compare the estimation results between 
Phases in order to examine the sensitivity of our results to the adoption of compliance rule in 
carbon market.19 
[TABLES 9 & 10 about here]  
Then, following the same estimation procedure, Model III (with basis) and Model III’ 
(with convenience yield) are estimated separately for each market regimes. The results (given 
in Tables 9 & 10) show that the sign and significance of key parameters are similar regardless 
of the measures for arbitrage opportunities (either basis or convenience yield). Nonetheless, 
                                                          
18 It is not surprising that commodity prices continued to rise after the onset of financial crisis and stock markets 
collapse in the summer 2007. Generally speaking, commodities tend to perform well in late expansion and early 
recessions. This is because interest rates are usually cut to boost economic activities when the economy is 
slowing down, which in turn may enhance the commodity prices (see Bodie and Rosansky, 1980).    
19 As a result of the banking restrictions imposed during the inter-phase period, the prices were very low at the 
end of Phase I i.e., 2007. We, therefore, follow Alberola and Chevallier (2009) and exclude 2007 data from our 
estimation.  
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the results for carbon market show that in Phase I, 2007 excluded, there is a higher 
autocorrelation or predictability (γ0) due to more significant arbitrage-induced feedback 
trading activity (γ2). The results of crude oil are however consistent with the full sample 
results, with insignificant γ1 and γ2. For coal market, the results of bear market are consistent 
with our main results, where γ1 is negative and significant while γ2 is positive and significant. 
The γ1 in bull market analysis is still negative and significant but γ2 turns to be insignificant. 
For electricity market, the results of bear market are also in line with the main tests, with 
positive and statistically significant γ1 and γ2. With regard to the natural gas, results of bull 
market are consistent with whole period analysis, with negative and significant γ1 and positive 
and significant γ2.  
In addition, two likelihood ratio tests are employed to examine the equality of parameters 
across market regimes. Specifically, LR1 tests the equality of γ1 across regimes while LR2 is 
used to test whether γ2 in bear market is same as that of bull market. The test results show that 
feedback trading parameters γ1, γ2 vary across market regime in most of the cases, perhaps 
due to the time-varying feedback trading behaviour over different regimes. One possible 
explanation is that a substantial amount of feedback trading is due to portfolio insurance 
strategies and the extensive use of stop-loss orders during market downturns. Margin trading 
could also be a contributing factor because during the sharp market declines there is a greater 
feedback activity that arises from the liquidations of margin accounts. Overall, this is 
consistent with our conjecture that intensity of feedback trading is related to the arbitrage 
opportunities, and that the significance of such relationship depends on the market regimes. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper has extended the heterogeneous trader model proposed by Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992) in order to examine the presence of feedback trading in carbon emission 
and energy futures markets and the extent to which such behaviour is linked to arbitrage 
opportunities. Specifically, we developed and estimated several feedback trading models in 
which the behaviour of feedback traders is conditional on the level of arbitrage opportunities. 
We investigated the statistical support for these new models using a daily dataset on emission 
and energy markets. Results show that there exists significant feedback trading in coal and 
electricity markets, but not in carbon, natural gas and crude oil markets. As the vast majority 
of investors in carbon markets are institutions, this result is consistent with the notion that 
institutional investors are not particularly susceptible to feedback-style investment strategies. 
In further analysis, we show that the intensity of feedback trading is significantly related to 
the level of arbitrage opportunities, and that the significance of such relationship varies across 
market regimes.  
Taken together, these findings add to the body of literature that studies the role of 
behaviourally biased feedback trading in commodity markets and the effect of arbitrage on 
such investment behaviour. The results in this paper are important in understanding investors’ 
trading behaviour and investment strategies in commodity markets, particularly on the newly 
opened carbon emission market where we find no evidence of feedback trading and that 
arbitrage opportunities do not affect the demand for shares by feedback traders. These 
findings should help policy makers and marker participants to grasp a deeper understanding 
of the trading behaviour of commodity investors. In particular, as most of the participants in 
the carbon markets are institutions, our results also add to the debate of whether institutional 
investors engage in feedback-style investment strategies. There is however some important 
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issues remain in the extant literature that requires further investigation. For instance, future 
research in this area may seek to identify the reasons why feedback trading is found in coal and 
electricity, but not in oil and gas, and why feedback trading is linked to arbitrage opportunities. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of emission and energy futures returns 
 Carbon Coal Electricity Natural gas Crude oil 
Panel A: summary statistics 
Mean -0.081 0.020 0.016 0.051 0.060 
Std. Dev. 2.661 1.719 2.297 4.146 2.176 
Skewness 0.075 -0.737 1.370 2.955 -0.114 
Kurtosis 7.097 9.331 16.641 27.952 6.067 
Jarque-Bera 836.370** 2850.619** 12114.920** 68303.070** 931.706** 
LB(12) 15.939 74.068** 57.885** 30.621** 35.812** 
LB2(12) 292.580** 1241.600** 56.654** 4.598 1446.9** 
ARCH(12) 122.439** 381.844** 35.883** 4.344 514.070** 
JOINT 47.291** 108.047** 32.303** 8.432* 61.930** 
 
Panel B : correlation coefficients  
Carbon 1     
Coal 0.295 1    
Electricity 0.256 0.381 1   
Natural gas 0.167 0.267 0.520 1  
Crude oil 0.264 0.360 0.137 0.105 1 
 
Panel C: autocorrelation 
b0 -0.084 0.015 0.018 0.050 0.064 
b1 0.033 0.193** 0.083** 0.036 -0.064** 
b2 -0.062* 0.005 0.002 -0.062** -0.007 
b3 0.036 0.019 -0.054* -0.038 0.017 
b4 0.003 0.034 0.028 -0.050* 0.046* 
b5 -0.004 -0.015 0.064* -0.001 -0.048* 
F-test 1.412 13.375** 4.431** 4.579** 4.436** 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics of emission and energy futures return series. LB(12) and LB2(12) 
are the Ljung-Box Q test of autocorrelation for the level and squared returns; the test statistics are following 
Chi-squared distribution with n (number of lags) degree of freedom. ARCH (12) is the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
test for ARCH effect. The JOINT test is Engle and Ng’s (1993) test for the potential asymmetries in conditional 
variance. The test is an F-test with the null hypothesis of b1=b2=b3 for the regression below: 
2 - - +
1 2 -1 2 -1= +b +b +b +t t t t t t tZ a S S S vε ε  
where Zt2 is the square of standardised residuals; St- is a dummy variable which equals 1 when εt-1 <0 and 0 
otherwise;  St+  is a dummy variable which equals 1 when εt-1 >0 and 0 otherwise. In Panel C, the autocorrelation 
parameters (b0 to b5) are estimated from the following regression: 
 
5
0 -
=1
= + +t i t i t
i
R b b R u∑   
** and * denote statistically significance at 1% and 5% respectively. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of spot-futures basis and convenience yield  
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics of emission and energy spot-futures basis and convenience yield. 
The basis is estimated as ,= ln ( / )t t t TBasis S F  
The convenience yield is approximated as: ,1 ln( )t Tt t
t
FCY Rf
T t S
= −
−
     
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Carbon Coal Electricity Natural gas Crude oil 
Panel A: basis statistics 
 Mean -0.008 0.003 -0.001 -0.047 -0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.014 0.031 0.060 0.174 0.025 
 Skewness -5.798 2.176 -4.027 -1.784 0.033 
 Kurtosis 58.151 18.252 45.775 18.195 6.589 
Panel B: convenience yield statistics 
 Mean -0.001 0.044 0.017 -0.376 0.181 
 Std. Dev. 0.045 0.327 0.639 0.156 0.223 
 Skewness -8.029 2.577 -7.357 -1.540 -0.047 
 Kurtosis 90.678 23.952 112.541 15.833 7.127 
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Table 3: Results of specification tests for various GARCH models 
 
 
GARCH EGARCH GJR-GARCH Model 
Selected Log L HMSE AIC Log L HMSE AIC Log L HMSE AIC 
Carbon -2697 3.570 4.530 -2686 3.417 4.513 -2690 3.389 4.520 EGARCH 
Coal -2732 4.472 3.383 -2741 4.669 3.396 -2727 4.112 3.378 GJR-GARCH 
Electricity -3193 12.904 4.262 -3174 12.529 4.238 -3193 12.855 4.263 EGARCH 
Natural gas -6931 36.709 5.567 -6860 28.460 5.511 -6892 30.504 5.536 EGARCH 
Crude oil -4945 2.874 4.193 - - - -4939 2.770 4.186 GJR-GARCH 
Notes: This table shows the results of specification tests for a selection of GARCH models, including standard 
GARCH, EGARCH and GJR-GARCH: 
GARCH: 2 2 20 1 1 1t t tσ α α ε βσ− −= + +  
GJR-GARCH: 2 2 2 20 1 11 1 1tt t t tIσ α α ε βσ δ ε−− − −= + + +    
EGARCH: 
0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tGσ α α βσ− −= + + ;   
1 1
1
1 1
2| |t tt
t t
G ε εδ
σ π σ
− −
−
− −
= − +  
The most appropriate model is selected based on several criteria, including the value of log-likelihood function 
(Log L), heteroscedasticity-adjusted mean squared error (HMSE) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). In 
each criterion, the best model is highlighted in bold. The ‘best-performing’ GARCH specification for each 
market is presented in the last column. “-” indicates that convergence cannot be reached. 
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Table 4: Evidence of feedback trading in the emission and energy markets (Model I) 
 Carbon (EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-GARCH) 
Panel A: conditional mean equation 
α -0.0006 (-0.092) 
0.0370 
(1.703) 
0.0498** 
(51.765) 
0.0337 
(1.576) 
0.1295 
(1.610) 
ρ -0.0001 (-0.019) 
-0.0003 
(-0.019) 
-0.0200** 
(-44.540) 
-0.0082** 
(-4.839) 
     -0.0090 
     (-0.451) 
γ0 
0.0063 
(0.998) 
0.2387** 
(8.372) 
0.0035** 
(18.768) 
0.0107 
(1.954) 
-0.0233 
(-0.819) 
γ1 
-0.0033 
(-0.971) 
-0.0093* 
(-2.020) 
0.0009** 
(28.966) 
-0.0002 
(-1.336) 
-0.0054 
(-1.713) 
 
Panel B: conditional variance equation 
α0 
0.0555* 
(2.551) 
0.0285** 
(5.231) 
0.0627** 
(17.217) 
0.0892** 
(24.228) 
0.0602** 
(2.846) 
α1 
0.2415** 
(3.385) 
0.1372** 
(8.990) 
0.2255** 
(33.042) 
0.2023** 
(15.072) 
0.0205* 
(2.439) 
β 0.9726** (92.511) 
0.8699** 
(196.031) 
0.9723** 
(529.183) 
0.9761** 
(629.888) 
0.9414** 
(73.544) 
δ -0.2820* (-2.565) 
-0.0252 
(-1.097) 
-0.0375** 
(-7.391) 
-0.2806** 
(-4.899) 
0.0452** 
(3.575) 
ν 1.3183** (16.714) 
1.2342** 
(23.880) 
0.8667** 
(31.443) 
0.7401** 
(44.265) 
1.5482** 
(22.885) 
Panel C: diagnostic tests 
E(Zt) -0.031 0.005 0.059 0.054 -0.012 
E(Z2t) 0.997 1.002 1.097 1.370 0.999 
LB(12) 11.599 15.594 21.477* 22.229** 6.546 
LB2(12) 5.097 11.283 3.526 3.130 8.200 
ARCH(12) 4.933 11.507 3.617 3.377 8.049 
JOINT 2.403 2.889 6.151 1.150 25.626** 
Notes: This table presents maximum likelihood estimates of the original SW feedback trading (i.e. baseline 
Model I) for emission and energy futures markets. The conditional mean equation is 
2 2
0 1 - 1( )t t tt tR Rα ρσ γ γ σ ε= + + + +   (Equation 9) 
The conditional variance equation is given by   
GJR-GARCH: 2 2 2 20 1 11 1 1tt t t tIσ α α ε βσ δ ε−− − −= + + +   OR 
EGARCH: 
0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tGσ α α βσ− −= + + ; 1 11
1 1
2| |t tt
t t
G ε εδ
σ π σ
− −
−
− −
= − +  
The error terms are assumed to follow the Generalised Error Distribution (GED) with a scale parameter of ν. 
The estimated t-statistics (shown in the parentheses) are robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using 
Bollerslev and Woodridge (1992) standard errors. ** and * denote statistical significance at 1 % and 5 % levels.  
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Table 5: The effect of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading (Model II) 
 Carbon (EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-GARCH) 
Panel A: conditional mean equation 
α 0.0048* (2.107) 
0.0475* 
(2.022) 
0.0248 
(0.737) 
0.0476** 
(64.410) 
0.1295** 
(2.901) 
ρ 0.0004 (0.106) 
-0.0091 
(-0.745) 
-0.0095** 
(-4.299) 
-0.0098** 
(-17.143) 
-0.0090  
(-0.822) 
γ0 
0.0048 
(0.754) 
0.2415** 
(10.598) 
0.0008 
(0.150) 
0.0010 
(1.260) 
-0.0234 
(-0.903) 
γ1 
-0.0032 
(-1.174) 
-0.0078* 
(-2.078) 
0.0005** 
(9.889) 
-0.0000 
(-0.874) 
-0.0050 
(-0.977) 
γ2 
0.2175 
(0.246) 
0.3558 
(1.854) 
-0.1558** 
(-5.110) 
-0.0023** 
(-149.491) 
0.0365 
(0.075) 
 
Panel B: conditional variance equation 
α0 
0.0554* 
(2.251) 
0.0284** 
(5.054) 
0.0550 
(1.740) 
0.0869** 
(7.193) 
0.0605* 
(2.359) 
α1 
0.2430** 
(3.183) 
0.1364** 
(20.656) 
0.2047** 
(10.331) 
0.2008** 
(67.117) 
0.0204* 
(2.203) 
β 0.9727** (81.106) 
0.8708** 
(181.365) 
0.9761** 
(39.372) 
0.9770** 
(483.135) 
0.9414** 
(64.231) 
δ -0.2818* (-2.550) 
-0.0257* 
(-2.222) 
0.0248 
(0.121) 
-0.2660** 
(-25.459) 
0.0452** 
(3.111) 
ν 1.3195** (14.855) 
1.2306** 
(24.599) 
0.8590** 
(14.357) 
0.7385** 
(24.633) 
1.548** 
(19.639) 
Panel C: diagnostic tests 
E(Zt) -0.030 0.004 0.052 0.055 -0.012 
E(Z2t) 0.997 1.002 1.096 1.368 0.999 
LB(12) 11.931 17.645* 19.429* 22.506* 6.548 
LB2(12) 5.197 11.057 3.470 3.128 8.816 
ARCH(12) 5.043 0.501 3.549 3.374 8.035 
JOINT 3.458 2.493 7.244 1.334 25.611** 
Notes: This table presents maximum likelihood estimates of our augmented SW feedback trading (i.e. Model II) 
for emission and energy futures markets. The level of arbitrage opportunities are measured by the lagged basis. 
The conditional mean equation is 
2 2 2
0 1 - 1 2 1( )t t tt t t tR R Bα ρσ γ γ σ γ σ ε−= + + + + +   (Equation 12) 
The conditional variance equation is given by   
GJR-GARCH: 2 2 2 20 1 11 1 1tt t t tIσ α α ε βσ δ ε−− − −= + + +   OR 
EGARCH: 
0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tGσ α α βσ− −= + + ; 1 11
1 1
2| |t tt
t t
G ε εδ
σ π σ
− −
−
− −
= − +  
The error terms are assumed to follow the Generalised Error Distribution (GED) with a scale parameter of ν. 
The estimated t-statistics (shown in the parentheses) are robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using 
Bollerslev and Woodridge (1992) standard errors. ** and * denote statistical significance at 1 % and 5 % levels.  
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Table 6: The effect of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading (Model III) 
 Carbon (EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-GARCH) 
Panel A: conditional mean equation 
α -0.0007 (-0.101) 
0.0327 
(1.393) 
0.0447** 
(22.044) 
0.0461** 
(70.101) 
0.1078 
(1.212) 
ρ -0.0001 (-0.017) 
0.0052 
(0.422) 
-0.0170** 
(-28.631) 
-0.0087** 
(-46.919) 
-0.0016 
(-0.067) 
γ0 
0.0063 
(0.892) 
0.2452** 
(10.689) 
0.0019** 
(6.879) 
0.0075** 
(2029.944) 
-0.0245 
(-0.782) 
γ1 
-0.0033 
(-0.751) 
-0.0132** 
(-3.274) 
0.0009** 
(19.289) 
-0.0001** 
(-25.101) 
-0.0050 
(-1.279) 
γ2 
0.0034 
(0.010) 
0.0913* 
(2.515) 
0.0595** 
(26.703) 
0.0005** 
(72.152) 
0.0262 
(0.569) 
 
Panel B: conditional variance equation 
α0 
0.0555* 
(2.547) 
0.0296** 
(8.105) 
0.0619** 
(13.729) 
0.0850** 
(35.112) 
0.0601* 
(2.488) 
α1 
0.2415** 
(3.309) 
0.1381** 
(40.428) 
0.2242** 
(37.780) 
0.1969** 
(109.364) 
0.0202* 
(2.433) 
β 0.9726** (92.340) 
0.8678** 
(468.580) 
0.9731** 
(476.477) 
0.9775** 
(5730.473) 
0.9417** 
(71.040) 
δ -0.2820** (-2.617) 
-0.0236** 
(-3.957) 
-0.0403 
(-1.344) 
-0.2806** 
(-217.348) 
0.0449** 
(3.106) 
ν 1.3182** (16.490) 
1.2274** 
(23.609) 
0.8641** 
(33.688) 
0.7389** 
(50.511) 
1.5501** 
(25.364) 
Panel C: diagnostic tests 
E(Zt) -0.031 0.005 0.064 0.052 -0.013 
E(Z2t) 0.997 1.002 1.095 1.366 0.999 
LB(12) 11.611 14.611 21.110* 22.865** 6.512 
LB2(12) 5.098 11.986 3.591 3.072 8.286 
ARCH(12) 4.934 12.131 3.669 3.308 8.134 
JOINT 2.464 2.783 6.394 1.267 23.048** 
Notes: This table presents maximum likelihood estimates of our augmented SW feedback trading (i.e. Model III) 
for emission and energy futures markets. The level of arbitrage opportunities are measured by the lagged basis. 
The conditional mean equation is 
2 2 2
0 1 - 12 1( )t t tt t t tR B Rα ρσ γ γ σ γ σ ε−= + + + + +   (Equation 15) 
The conditional variance equation is given by   
GJR-GARCH: 2 2 2 20 1 11 1 1tt t t tIσ α α ε βσ δ ε−− − −= + + +   OR 
EGARCH: 
0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tGσ α α βσ− −= + + ; 1 11
1 1
2| |t tt
t t
G ε εδ
σ π σ
− −
−
− −
= − +  
The error terms are assumed to follow the Generalised Error Distribution (GED) with a scale parameter of ν. 
The estimated t-statistics (shown in the parentheses) are robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using 
Bollerslev and Woodridge (1992) standard errors. ** and * denote statistical significance at 1 % and 5 % levels.  
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Table 7: The effect of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading (Model II’)   
 Carbon (EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-GARCH) 
Panel A: conditional mean equation 
α -0.0002 (-0.017) 
0.0470* 
(2.001) 
0.0577** 
(14.789) 
0.0316** 
(29.115) 
0.1269 
(1.574) 
ρ -0.0003 (-0.057) 
-0.0094 
(-0.765) 
-0.0226** 
(-9.730) 
-0.0081** 
(-20.204) 
-0.0092 
(-0.451) 
γ0 
0.0060 
(0.264) 
0.2413** 
(10.597) 
0.0023 
(1.061) 
0.0062** 
(22.884) 
-0.0235 
(-0.899) 
γ1 
-0.0033 
(-0.900) 
-0.0081* 
(-2.179) 
0.0012** 
(6.869) 
-0.0004** 
(-20.640) 
-0.0022 
(-0.3145) 
γ2 
0.0452 
(0.306) 
0.0349 
(1.952) 
-0.0099** 
(-237.698) 
-0.0010** 
(-34.507) 
0.0361 
(0.711) 
 
Panel B: conditional variance equation 
α0 
0.0558* 
(2.390) 
0.0283** 
(5.039) 
0.0599** 
(4.229) 
0.0938** 
(17.675) 
0.0601* 
(2.275) 
α1 
0.2424** 
(3.146) 
0.1363** 
(20.687) 
0.2203** 
(7.116) 
0.2083** 
(48.231) 
0.0203 
(1.708) 
β 0.9725** (83.699) 
0.8712** 
(181.706) 
0.9738** 
(179.547) 
0.9746** 
(3084.200) 
0.9415** 
(61.787) 
δ -0.2814** (-2.761) 
-0.260* 
(-2.265) 
-0.0303 
(-0.907) 
-0.2695** 
(-15.948) 
0.0454* 
(2.509) 
ν 1.3189** (14.428) 
1.2294** 
(24.583) 
0.8686** 
(23.006) 
0.7367** 
(30.144) 
1.5492** 
(21.305) 
Panel C: diagnostic tests 
E(Zt) -0.030 0.004 0.062 0.052 -0.012 
E(Z2t) 0.997 1.002 1.100 1.361 0.999 
LB(12) 11.658 18.023* 19.632* 22.770** 6.658 
LB2(12) 5.117 10.917 3.483 3.201 8.179 
ARCH(12) 4.956 11.193 3.568 3.461 8.019 
JOINT 3.072 2.421 6.437 1.196 24.578** 
Notes: This table presents maximum likelihood estimates of our augmented SW feedback trading (i.e. Model II’) 
for emission and energy futures markets. The level of arbitrage opportunities are measured by convenience yield. 
The conditional mean equation is 
2 2 2
0 1 - 1 2 1( )t t tt t t tR R CYα ρσ γ γ σ γ σ ε−= + + + + +   (Equation 22) 
The conditional variance equation is given by   
GJR-GARCH: 2 2 2 20 1 11 1 1tt t t tIσ α α ε βσ δ ε−− − −= + + +   OR 
EGARCH: 
0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tGσ α α βσ− −= + + ; 1 11
1 1
2| |t tt
t t
G ε εδ
σ π σ
− −
−
− −
= − +  
The error terms are assumed to follow the Generalised Error Distribution (GED) with a scale parameter of ν. 
The estimated t-statistics (shown in the parentheses) are robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using 
Bollerslev and Woodridge (1992) standard errors. ** and * denote statistical significance at 1 % and 5 % levels.  
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Table 8: The effect of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading (Model III’)   
 Carbon (EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-GARCH) 
Panel A: conditional mean equation 
α -0.0007 (-0.075) 
0.0343 
(1.458) 
0.0448** 
(7.663) 
0.0216** 
(13.548) 
0.1294 
(1.395) 
ρ -0.0000 (-0.001) 
0.0036 
(0.292) 
-0.0171** 
(-7.055) 
-0.0040** 
(-56.161) 
-0.0090 
(-0.364) 
γ0 
0.0057 
(0.484) 
0.2451** 
(10.742) 
0.0018 
(0.564) 
0.0100** 
(70.465) 
-0.0233 
(-0.780) 
γ1 
-0.0032 
(-0.856) 
-0.0127** 
(-3.371) 
0.0008** 
(5.846) 
-0.0003** 
(-82.057) 
-0.0054 
(-1.390) 
γ2 
0.0188 
(0.480) 
0.0083** 
(2.925) 
0.0052** 
(50.597) 
0.0004** 
(188.229) 
0.0000 
(0.004) 
 
Panel B: conditional variance equation 
α0 
0.0553* 
(2.229) 
0.0293** 
(5.105) 
0.0600** 
(15.415) 
0.0875** 
(6.588) 
0.0602* 
(2.439) 
α1 
0.2411** 
(3.198) 
0.1377** 
(20.384) 
0.2223** 
(13.489) 
0.1988** 
(341.708) 
0.0204 
(1.871) 
β 0.9728** (78.799) 
0.8684** 
(177.265) 
0.9740** 
(331.295) 
0.9765** 
(273.398) 
0.9414** 
(64.553) 
δ -0.2830** (-2.913) 
-0.0239* 
(-1.991) 
-0.0376 
(-0.560) 
-0.2707** 
(-85.447) 
0.0452** 
(2.968) 
ν 1.3177** (13.421) 
1.228** 
(24.692) 
0.8653** 
(31.474) 
0.7321** 
(28.612) 
1.5482** 
(20.480) 
Panel C: diagnostic tests 
E(Zt) -0.030 0.005 0.062 0.043 -0.012 
E(Z2t) 0.997 1.002 1.098 1.359 0.999 
LB(12) 11.520 14.593 20.968* 22.799** 6.546 
LB2(12) 5.125 12.214 3.577 3.076 8.200 
ARCH(12) 4.959 12.357 3.656 3.316 8.049 
JOINT 2.571 2.739 6.456 1.310 25.625** 
Notes: This table presents maximum likelihood estimates of our augmented SW feedback trading (i.e. Model 
III’) for emission and energy futures markets. The level of arbitrage opportunities are measured by convenience 
yield. The conditional mean equation is 
2 2 2
0 1 - 12 1( )t t tt t t tR CY Rα ρσ γ γ σ γ σ ε−= + + + + +  (Equation 23) 
The conditional variance equation is given by   
GJR-GARCH: 2 2 2 20 1 11 1 1tt t t tIσ α α ε βσ δ ε−− − −= + + +   OR 
EGARCH: 
0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tGσ α α βσ− −= + + ; 1 11
1 1
2| |t tt
t t
G ε εδ
σ π σ
− −
−
− −
= − +  
The error terms are assumed to follow the Generalised Error Distribution (GED) with a scale parameter of ν. 
The estimated t-statistics (shown in the parentheses) are robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using 
Bollerslev and Woodridge (1992) standard errors. ** and * denote statistical significance at 1 % and 5 % levels.  
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Table 9: The effect of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading across market regimes (Model III)   
 
Phase I  Bull Market Phase II  Bear Market 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-
GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-
GARCH) 
 Carbon (EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-
GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-
GARCH) 
 
Panel A: conditional mean equation 
α 0.0880 (1.564) 
0.0751 
(1.690) 
0.0867** 
(18.251) 
0.0467** 
(83.348) 
0.1669 
(0.235) 
-0.0007 
(-0.101) 
0.0069 
(0.196) 
0.0874** 
(8.310) 
-0.0346** 
(-7.517) 
0.0789 
(0.862) 
ρ -0.0054 (-0.939) 
0.0287** 
(6.720) 
-0.0130** 
(-36.058) 
-0.0110** 
(-446.346) 
0.0017 
(0.008) 
-0.0001 
(-0.017) 
-0.0043 
(-0.230) 
-0.0469** 
(-11.793) 
-0.0067** 
(-8.637) 
-0.0084 
(-0.349) 
γ0 
0.2369** 
(20.397) 
0.2570** 
(12.356) 
0.0321** 
(95.805) 
0.0985** 
(196.299) 
0.0332 
(0.292) 
0.0063 
(0.892) 
0.2403** 
(6.769) 
-0.0409 
(-1.934) 
-0.0482** 
(-78.476) 
0.0265 
(0.684) 
γ1 
-0.0002 
(-0.295) 
-0.0203** 
(-4.224) 
-0.0002** 
(-12.319) 
-0.0009** 
(-187.517) 
-0.0287 
(-0.925) 
-0.0033 
(-0.751) 
-0.0115** 
(-2.784) 
0.0162** 
(35.415) 
0.0031** 
(9.336) 
-0.0063 
(-1.620) 
γ2 
-0.0003** 
(-3.320) 
-0.0316 
(-1.534) 
0.0264** 
(220.960) 
0.0002** 
(363.464) 
0.2788 
(1.259) 
0.0034 
(0.010) 
0.0852* 
(2.496) 
0.1363** 
(2.615) 
0.0064** 
(7.130) 
0.0019 
(0.047) 
 
Panel B: conditional variance equation 
α0 
0.1989** 
(3.225) 
0.0676* 
(2.136) 
0.1344** 
(190.588) 
0.2779** 
(912.242) 
0.1462 
(0.715) 
0.0555* 
(2.547) 
0.0249* 
(2.545) 
0.0338 
(1.556) 
0.0369* 
(2.150) 
0.0466 
(0.114) 
α1 
0.5794** 
(36.400) 
0.2204** 
(5.347) 
0.3097** 
(31.075) 
0.3670** 
(222.132) 
0.0201 
(1.895) 
0.2415** 
(3.309) 
0.1161** 
(11.377) 
0.1485** 
(5.153) 
0.1706** 
(7.545) 
0.0103 
(0.655) 
β 0.9114** (31.686) 
0.8047** 
(18.742) 
0.9566** 
(819.173) 
0.9222** 
(1302.311) 
0.9252** 
(12.581) 
0.9726** 
(92.340) 
0.8771** 
(112.780) 
0.9813** 
(50.177) 
0.9896** 
(203.004) 
0.9411** 
(32.815) 
δ -0.2265** (-5.413) 
-0.0706** 
(-3.408) 
-0.2263** 
(-52.147) 
-0.3881** 
(-143.684) 
0.0286 
(0.863) 
-0.2820** 
(-2.617) 
-0.0004 
(-0.014) 
0.1718 
(0.369) 
-0.2689* 
(-2.541) 
0.0732** 
(2.661) 
ν 1.1593** (11.397) 
1.1537** 
(12.448) 
0.7838** 
(31.110) 
0.6576** 
(46.885) 
1.7200** 
(14.503) 
1.3182** 
(16.490) 
1.250** 
(18.014) 
0.9073** 
(22.795) 
0.9741** 
(16.197) 
1.3754** 
(14.457) 
Panel C: likelihood ratio tests      
LR1 - - - - - 0.506 8.349** 1285.321** 144.494** 33.133** 
LR2 - - - - - 0.0001 10.820** 4.447* 47.727** 48.807** 
43 
 
Table 9 (Continued) 
 
 Phase I  Bull Market  Phase II  Bear Market 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-
GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-
GARCH) 
 Carbon (EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-
GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-
GARCH) 
Panel D: diagnostic tests 
E(Zt) -0.082 0.031 0.099 0.067 -0.006 -0.031 -0.006 0.057 0.049 -0.020 
E(Z2t) 1.040 1.000 1.013 1.453 0.998 0.997 1.007 1.107 1.115 1.001 
LB(12) 25.827** 6.636 17.970* 9.812 4.864 11.611 11.824 13.064 27.274** 8.233 
LB2(12) 9.633 3.204 2.112 3.665 16.864 5.098 12.968 2.890 3.198 14.930 
ARCH(12) 9.281 2.872 2.156 4.208 17.500 4.934 13.638 2.929 3.159 14.361 
JOINT 2.003 3.019 2.106    0.314 17.819** 2.464 2.428 8.945* 4.113 15.990** 
Notes: This table presents maximum likelihood estimates of our augmented SW feedback trading (i.e. Model III) for emission and energy futures markets across different 
market regimes. The level of arbitrage opportunities are measured by the lagged basis. The bull market is defined as the period before 31 July 2008 and bear market is the 
period thereafter. For carbon market, we compare the results between Phase I (June 2005 to December 2006) and Phase II (March 2008 to September 2012, i.e., the initial full 
sample period). The conditional mean equation is 
2 2 2
0 1 - 12 1( )t t tt t t tR B Rα ρσ γ γ σ γ σ ε−= + + + + +   (Equation 15) 
The conditional variance equation is given by   
GJR-GARCH: 2 2 2 20 1 11 1 1tt t t tIσ α α ε βσ δ ε−− − −= + + +   OR 
EGARCH: 
0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tGσ α α βσ− −= + + ; 1 11
1 1
2| |t tt
t t
G ε εδ
σ π σ
− −
−
− −
= − +  
The error terms are assumed to follow the Generalised Error Distribution (GED) with a scale parameter of ν. The estimated t-statistics (shown in the parentheses) are robust 
to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using Bollerslev and Woodridge (1992) standard errors. ** and * denote statistical significance at 1 % and 5 % levels. LR1 is the 
likelihood ratio tests for the equality of γ1 across market regimes and LR2 is the test for equality of γ2 in bull and bear markets (or Phases I & II). 
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Table 10: The effect of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading across market regimes (Model III’)   
 
Phase I Bull Market Phase II Bear Market 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-
GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-
GARCH) 
 Carbon (EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-
GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-
GARCH) 
Panel A: conditional mean equation 
α 0.0822 (0.627) 
0.0753 
(1.860) 
0.0722** 
(16.594) 
0.0299** 
(706.041) 
0.2884 
(0.461) 
-0.0007 
(-0.075) 
0.0079 
(0.242) 
0.1080** 
(14.324) 
-0.0333** 
(-15.896) 
0.0918 
(0.995) 
ρ -0.0047 (-0.452) 
0.0287** 
(3.446) 
-0.0098** 
(-47.423) 
-0.0074** 
(-58.493) 
-0.0361 
(-0.200) 
-0.0000 
(-0.001) 
-0.0051 
(-0.364) 
-0.0573** 
(-38.552) 
-0.0069** 
(-44.818) 
-0.0131 
(-0.555) 
γ0 
0.2322** 
(3.189) 
0.2583** 
(139.026) 
0.0303** 
(64.712) 
0.0790** 
(101.711) 
0.0276 
(0.238) 
0.0057 
(0.484) 
0.2419** 
(9.960) 
-0.0370** 
(-262.204) 
-0.0477** 
(-116.127) 
0.0284 
(0.816) 
γ1 
-0.0001 
(-0.168) 
-0.0203** 
(-40.681) 
-0.0004** 
(-4.466) 
-0.0005** 
(-53.254) 
-0.0286 
(-0.957) 
-0.0032 
(-0.856) 
-0.0115** 
(-4.288) 
0.0164** 
(93.560) 
0.0032** 
(40.091) 
-0.0067 
(-1.645) 
γ2 
-0.0002** 
(-6.738) 
-0.0032 
(-1.483) 
0.0020** 
(144.546) 
0.0000 
(0.069) 
0.0196 
(0.847) 
0.0188 
(0.480) 
0.0079** 
(2.7875) 
0.0021* 
(2.145) 
0.0005** 
(186.894) 
-0.0016 
(-0.327) 
 
Panel B: conditional variance equation 
α0 
0.2017** 
(3.528) 
0.0676 
(1.816) 
0.14112** 
(62.868) 
0.300** 
(81.749) 
0.1659 
(0.4126) 
0.0553* 
(2.229) 
0.0249** 
(3.159) 
0.0387** 
(34.744) 
0.371** 
(34.378) 
0.0460* 
(2.001) 
α1 
0.5848** 
(26.490) 
0.2202** 
(8.772) 
0.3083** 
(11.994) 
0.3886** 
(33.088) 
0.0219 
(0.651) 
0.2411** 
(3.198) 
0.1159** 
(4.525) 
0.1651** 
(12.969) 
0.1714** 
(27.437) 
0.0104 
(0.753) 
β 0.9104** (31.008) 
0.8048** 
(19.085) 
0.9535** 
(867.714) 
0.9152** 
(1968.260) 
0.9175** 
(12.786) 
0.9728** 
(78.799) 
0.8772** 
(47.166) 
0.9789** 
(5983.324) 
0.9895** 
(548.652) 
0.9412** 
(48.778) 
δ -0.2306* (-2.336) 
-0.0705** 
(-2.959) 
-0.2345** 
(-15.648) 
-0.3564** 
(-25.951) 
0.0294 
(0.651) 
-0.2830** 
(-2.913) 
-0.0001 
(-0.005) 
0.0777** 
(4.999) 
-0.2656** 
(-3.658) 
0.0731** 
(3.386) 
ν 1.1573** (11.868) 
1.1538** 
(12.484) 
0.7810** 
(21.784) 
0.6547** 
(48.946) 
1.7074** 
(14.578) 
1.3177** 
(13.421) 
1.2507** 
(18.094) 
0.9131** 
(21.407) 
0.9740** 
(29.563) 
1.3744** 
(17.381) 
Panel C:  likelihood ratio tests 
LR1 - - - - - 2.113 9.737** 9184.956** 2144.525** 28.403** 
LR2 - - - - - 0.149 14.145** 0.004 34929.384** 18.436** 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
 
Phase I Bull Market Phase II Bear Market 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-
GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-
GARCH) 
 Carbon (EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-
GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-
GARCH) 
Panel D: diagnostic tests      
E(Zt) -0.080 0.031 0.109 0.064 -0.006 -0.030 -0.007 0.056 0.048 -0.020 
E(Z2t) 1.038 1.000 1.047 1.455 0.999 0.997 1.007 1.107 1.115 1.001 
LB(12) 25.426** 6.613 18.011* 10.606 5.052 11.520 11.914 12.990 27.062** 8.261 
LB2(12) 9.593 3.200 2.177 3.497 17.286 5.125 13.225 3.024 3.180 14.901 
ARCH(12) 9.300 2.868 2.246 3.990 17.859 4.959 13.883 3.056 3.140 14.318 
JOINT 1.832 3.021 2.649    0.691 16.945** 2.571 2.481 9.131* 4.100 16.009** 
Notes: This table presents maximum likelihood estimates of our augmented SW feedback trading (i.e. Model III’) for emission and energy futures markets across different 
market regimes. The level of arbitrage opportunities are measured by convenience yield. The bull market is defined as the period before 31 July 2008 and bear market is the 
period thereafter. For carbon market, we compare the results between Phase I (June 2005 to December 2006) and Phase II (March 2008 to September 2012, i.e., the initial full 
sample period). The conditional mean equation is 
2 2 2
0 1 - 12 1( )t t tt t t tR CY Rα ρσ γ γ σ γ σ ε−= + + + + +  (Equation 23) 
The conditional variance equation is given by   
GJR-GARCH: 2 2 2 20 1 11 1 1tt t t tIσ α α ε βσ δ ε−− − −= + + +   OR 
EGARCH: 
0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tGσ α α βσ− −= + + ; 1 11
1 1
2| |t tt
t t
G ε εδ
σ π σ
− −
−
− −
= − +  
The error terms are assumed to follow the Generalised Error Distribution (GED) with a scale parameter of ν. The estimated t-statistics (shown in the parentheses) are robust 
to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using Bollerslev and Woodridge (1992) standard errors. ** and * denote statistical significance at 1 % and 5 % levels. LR1 is the likelihood ratio tests for the equality of γ1 across market regimes and LR2 is the test for equality of γ2 in bull and bear markets (or Phases I & II). 
